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OPINION OF THE COURT

McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Sea-Land Service, Inc. seeks review of an order of the
United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board which
affirmed the adverse decision of an Administrative Law Judge. The
ALJ held that Sea-Land was liable for a twenty percent penalty on
an overdue compensation award under § 14(f) of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. (1988)
(the "Act" or the "LHWCA").

For the reasons that follow, we will

deny the petition for review and affirm the decision of the
Board.

I.
James Barry filed an occupational disease claim for
$4,090.51 against Sea-Land under the LHWCA.
Sea-Land's

counsel

submitted

a

stipulation

On January 2, 1991,
memorializing

the

parties' settlement of Barry's claim to Administrative Law Judge
Ralph A. Romano who was then presiding over the matter.

The ALJ

approved

the

terms

of

this

settlement

in

an

Order

Approving

Settlement which was filed in the office of the district director
on Tuesday, January 15, 1991.

On that same date the order was

sent to the parties by certified mail.
On Friday, January 25, 1991, a copy of the ALJ's Order
Approving Settlement was received in the office of Crawford &
Company, Sea-Land's adjuster for workers' compensation claims.
Crawford

and

Company

made

payment

on

Sea-Land's

behalf

in

accordance with the terms of settlement by a check dated January
30, 1991. The check was probably mailed to Barry the same day.1
Barry subsequently asserted that Sea-Land's payment had
been untimely and petitioned the district director to assess a
twenty percent penalty against Sea-Land under 33 U.S.C. § 914(f)
("§ 14(f)" of the Act).2

The district director granted the

request and ordered Sea-Land to pay the additional twenty percent
penalty, which amounted to $818.10.
entitlement

to

the

penalty,

and

Sea-Land disputed Barry's
the

matter

was

ultimately

1 The ALJ made no finding on whether the check was mailed
the same day it was drawn; the evidence showed only that it was
Crawford & Company's usual business practice to mail such checks
on the same day the order is received in Crawford's offices.
2

Section 14(f) of the LHWCA provides in relevant part:
If any compensation, payable under the
terms of an award, is not paid within ten
days after it becomes due, there shall be
added to such unpaid compensation an amount
equal to 20 per centum thereof, . . . unless
review of the compensation order making such
award is had as provided in section 921 of
this title and an order staying payment has
been issued by the Board or the court.

referred

to

the

Office

of

Administrative

Law

Judges

for

a

hearing.

After conducting a formal hearing, ALJ Paul H. Teitler

issued a decision and order on March 2, 1992, in which he ruled
against Sea-Land and imposed the twenty percent penalty.
Sea-Land

paid

decision to the Board.

the

penalty

but

appealed

the

ALJ's

On December 30, 1993, the Board affirmed

the decision and order of ALJ Teitler and modified the award to
reflect

Barry's

entitlement

to

interest

on

the

late

penalty

payment. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 33
U.S.C. § 921(c).
II.
We

first

address

the

Director's

challenge

to

the

Board's jurisdiction, and thus to our jurisdiction to review the
Board's order.

Section 921(b)(3) of the Act provides that “[t]he

Board shall be authorized to hear and determine appeals raising a
substantial

question

of

law

or

fact

taken

by

any

party

in

interest from decisions with respect to claims of employees under
this chapter . . . .” Once the Board has rendered a decision,
“[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of
the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States
court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred . .
. .” 33 U.S.C. § 921(c).
The Director contends that the order imposing a penalty
under § 14(f) is a "supplementary order declaring the amount of
the default" under § 18(a).
follows:

Section 18(a) provides in part as

In case of default by the employer in
the payment of compensation due under any
award of compensation . . . the person to
whom such compensation is payable may . . .
make application to the deputy commissioner
making
the
compensation
order
[f]or
a
supplementary order declaring the amount of
the default. . . . The applicant may file a
certified copy of such supplementary order
with the clerk of the Federal district court
. . . .
Such supplementary order of the
deputy commissioner shall be final, and the
court shall upon the filing of the copy enter
judgment for the amount declared in default
by the supplementary order . . . . Review of
the judgment so entered may be had as in
civil suits for damages at common law.
33 U.S.C. §

918(a) (1988).

The Director argues that such an

order is enforceable in district court proceedings but that such
enforcement is outside the review jurisdiction of the Board.
In essence, the Director maintains that payment under a
§ 18(a) order without initiating enforcement proceedings in the
district

court

constitutes

a

waiver

validity of the § 18(a) award.

of

any

objection

to the

Thus, the Director urges that,

rather than paying the § 14(f) penalty, Sea-Land should have
refused to pay and thereby compelled the Director to enforce the
order in a district court enforcement proceeding.
The

Director's

logic

would

require

We disagree.
an

employer

to

deliberately withhold payment to a claimant in order to force
litigation in a district court. The claimant would then have to
await the outcome of that litigation before receiving his or her
payment.

This

result

is

inconsistent

compensatory philosophy of the Act.

with

the

underlying

The LHWCA seeks to protect

claimants and provide effective and expeditious compensation to

those who are entitled to it.

See Strachan Shipping Co. v.

Hollis, 460 F.2d 1108, 1114 & n.9 (1972).
It would be counterproductive for us to conclude that
an employer who disagrees with a compensation order must withhold
payment

thereby

forcing

the

claimant

to

initiate

enforcement

proceedings in order to have the validity of the award reviewed.
The purpose of the Act is to place the compensation award in the
hands of the entitled claimant as soon as possible.

See id.;

Arrow Stevedore Co. v. Pillsbury, 12 F. Supp. 920, 922 (N.D. Cal.
1935); aff'd, 88 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1937).
regarding

enforcement

proceedings

applies

The Act's provision
only

"[i]f

employer . . . fails to comply with a compensation order."
U.S.C. §

an[]
33

921(d). The Act provides in relevant part as follows:
If any employer or his [or her] officers
or agents fails to comply with a compensation
order making an award, that has become final,
any
beneficiary
of
such
award
or
the
[district director]3 making the order, may
apply for the enforcement of the order to the
Federal district court for the judicial
district in which the injury occurred.

Id. (emphasis added).

The decision of the district court can

then be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals, thereby
giving two levels of appeal.

However, when an employer pays the

§ 14(f) penalty in accordance with the objectives of the statute,
but disputes the validity of that award, there is no need for an

3

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 702.105, the term "district director"
has been substituted for the term "deputy commissioner" which is
used in the statute.

enforcement action in a district court, and the language of the
statute does not provide for one in that instance.
Once the award has been paid, review is not available
(and

is

not

proceeding.

warranted)

in

a

district

court

enforcement

Thus, we must conclude that Congress intended to

provide that an aggrieved party could pay a penalty under § 14(f)
and

then

challenge

the

propriety

of

the

assessment

of

that

penalty in a proceeding brought before the Benefits Review Board.
Section 921(c) then allows the aggrieved party to appeal the
Board's

decision

to

the

appropriate

court

of

appeals.

Accordingly, the Board properly held that it had jurisdiction to
decide this appeal from the decision of the ALJ.
III.
The central issues in this case involve the application
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the LHWCA.
81(a)(6)

provides

that

the

Rules

apply

to

"proceedings

Rule
for

enforcement or review of compensation orders" under the LHWCA (§§
18 and 21 of the Act).4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6).

That Rule is

not, however, intended to extend the scope of the Rules beyond
their intended application to "procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature."
4

Fed. R. Civ. P.

"Although § 914 is not mentioned specifically in Rule
81(a)(6) . . . [an order based upon] `a "Section 14(f)
assessment" . . . [is] a "supplementary order declaring the
amount of the default" within the meaning of Section 18(a) of the
LHWCA.'" Quave v. Progress Marine, 912 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 2012 (1991)
(quoting Lauzon v. Strachan Shipping Co., 782 F.2d 1217, 1219
(5th Cir. 1985)).

1.

Payment

of

the

award

at

issue

here

did

not

involve

a

"procedure in the United States district courts" and the Director
therefore argues that the Rules do not apply to the computation
of timeliness for such payment.

However, we need not decide the

issue of the general applicability of the Rules to the instant
penalty assessment because, assuming arguendo that the Rules do
apply, Sea-Land still cannot prevail.
A.
Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

6(a)

provides

in

pertinent part:
In
computing
any
period
of
time
prescribed . . . by these rules . . . the day
of the act . . . from which the designated
period of time begins to run shall not be
included.
The last day of the period so
computed shall be included, unless it is a
Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday . . . in
which event the period runs until the end of
the next day which is not one of the
aforementioned days. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days,
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays
shall
be
excluded
in
the
computation.
Rule 6(a) would require that five days be excluded from the
computation of timeliness.5

Accordingly, if Rule 6(a) applies,

Sea-Land would have mailed payment on the tenth day.

Sea-Land

further asserts that it should be afforded an additional 3 days

5

There were five days falling either on a weekend or on a
holiday (Martin Luther King's Birthday) between Tuesday, January
15, 1991 (the date the Order Approving Settlement was filed in
the office of the district director) and Wednesday, January 30,
1991 (the date Crawford & Company issued the compensation check).

to pay Barry under Rule 6(e) and that its payment was, therefore,
timely.
Rule 6(e) provides:
Whenever a party has the right or is required
to do some act or take some proceedings
within a prescribed period after the service
of a notice or other paper upon the party and
the notice or paper is served upon the party
by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (emphasis added).
applies,

Sea-Land

would

be

allowed

delivery of the check to Barry.

an

Thus, if Rule 6(e)
additional

3

days

for

We conclude, however, that Rule

6(e) does not apply.
B.
Rule 6(e) is triggered by the requirement of "service
of a notice or other paper."
LHWCA.

There is no such condition in the

Section 14(f) of the Act requires that a 20 percent

penalty be added if compensation is not paid within "ten days
after it becomes due" (emphasis added).

A compensation order

becomes "due" or "effective when filed in the office of the
deputy commissioner."

33 U.S.C. §

921(a).

See also Lauzon v.

Strachan Shipping Co. 782 F.2d 1217, 1220 (5th Cir. 1985) ("`The
term `effective' in § 921(a) is equivalent to the terms `due' and
`due

and

payable'

in

§§

914(f)

and

918(a),

respectively.'

Consequently the time for payment started running when the award
was filed, and not when [the employer] was served.") (citation
omitted).

The Board correctly surmised the relevant distinction

between the language in Rule 6(e) and the requirements of §

14(f).

Citing the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Lauzon, the Board

stated that "Rule 6(e) is inapplicable in cases involving Section
14(f) as it requires an action to occur within 10 days of filing
and not 10 days of service as contemplated by Rule 6(e)."

Barry

v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 27 BRBS at 263.
Sea-Land claims that the Board erred in not considering
that the compensation order must be served on the claimant and
the employer before it is "filed" under § 19(e) of the LHWCA.

In

essence, Sea-Land argues that the filing, and the service of a
compensation

order,

are

inseparable.

This

interpretation

strained as it is contrary to the plain meaning of § 19(e).

is
See

Bethlehem Steel v. OSHA, 573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978) (a
statute cannot be interpreted in a manner that strains "the plain
and natural meaning of words").

The Act does not define "filing"

but

and

it

is

clear

that

filing

mailing

are

two

distinct

procedures, and that service is not necessary to trigger the ten
day payment period.
Our analysis is further illuminated by the language of
the regulation implementing § 19(e). That regulation provides
that upon receipt of a compensation order from an administrative
law judge,
the district director . . . shall formally date and
file the transcript, pleadings, and compensation order
(original) in his [or her] office. Such filing shall
be accomplished by the close of business on the next
succeeding working day, and the district director
shall, on the same day as the filing was accomplished,
send by certified mail a copy of the compensation order
to the parties and to representatives of the parties,
if any.

20 C.F.R. § 702.349 (1994) (emphasis added).

Thus, although the

order must be mailed on the same day that it is filed, the act of
filing the order is what triggers the employer's duty to make
payment in accordance with the order.
This

interpretation

is

consistent

with

that

of

the

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Jeffboat, Inc. v.
Mann, 875 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1989).

In a similar situation, the

court in Jeffboat ruled that the thirty-day period for filing an
appeal under § 21(a) began to run on the date the judge's order
was filed in the office of the deputy commissioner; not on the
date copies of the order were mailed to the parties.

Id. at 664.

Specifically,

the

the

court

stated

"we

hold

that

Deputy

Commissioner’s failure to mail a copy of the ALJ’s order to
Jeffboat’s counsel did not prevent the order from being ‘filed’
and

becoming

effective,

and

thus

[the

employer’s]

appeal from that order was untimely.” Id.
"the language of [20 C.F.R. §

notice

of

The court noted that

702.349] does not make proper

mailing part of filing: the regulation mandates that the copies
be sent `on the same day as the filing was accomplished'; if
filing is not complete until copies are mailed to the parties'
representatives, the distinction would make no sense."
663.

Id. at

We agree.
Rule

6(e)

does

not

apply

and

Sea-Land’s

payment,

(though arguably mailed on the tenth day under Rule 6 (a)) was
nevertheless not timely unless Sea-Land “paid” Barry when the
check was mailed, and not when it was received by Barry.
IV.

Sea-Land

argues

that

compensation

under

the

Act

is

"paid" when the check is mailed not when it is received by the
claimant, and that we must reject the Board's ruling to the
contrary.

We have previously stated that "`[p]ayment on a check

that is not post-dated is effective as of the date the check is
delivered,"

Staff Builders, Inc. v. Koschitzki, 989 F.2d 692,

695 (3d Cir. 1993).
Although we have not previously addressed this issue
directly, our determination that the “receipt rule” determines
when a claimant is “paid” under § 14(f) is consistent with prior
rulings of the Board. “[W]e note that the Board has previously
considered and rejected employer’s argument that payment should
be considered to have been made on the date the check was placed
in the mail instead of the date claimant received the check.”
Matthews v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 22 BRBS
440, 442 (1989) (citing McKamie v. Transworld Drilling Co., 7
BRBS 315 (1978)).

Although we are not bound by decisions of the

Board, they are nevertheless helpful to our present analysis.
Our analysis is also consistent with the general common
law principle that "[p]ayment is not effectuated by sending the
amount due to the creditor by mail or other public carrier until
the remittance gets into the hands of the creditor."
Payment § 9 (1987) (footnotes omitted).

70 C.J.S.

As previously noted,

Sea-Land did not mail Barry's check until January 30, 1991, which
was the last possible date for payment if Rule 6(a) applies.

We

assume (as did the Board) that the payment was not received on

the same day it was mailed.

Accordingly, it was received beyond

the tenth day and was therefore not timely.6
We are not unsympathetic to Sea-Land’s assertion of the
unfair and often impractical results of penalizing an employer
for

circumstances

control.

which

may

be

well

beyond

the

employer's

We agree that the "receipt rule" could "be impractical

and inequitable by very often placing employers in positions
where they would be exposed to the Section 14(f) penalty through
absolutely no fault of their own."

Petitioner's Brief at 13.

Indeed, this case is just such an example as Barry's check was
apparently mailed on the same day that Crawford received the
order for payment.
Such equitable complaints are not new, and although we
are

sympathetic,

we

are

bound

by

the

statute

before

us.

Moreover, similar complaints about the inequities of the "receipt
rule" have been rejected by other courts of appeals.

In Lauzon,

the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit responded to such
complaints by stating "that section 914(f) does not admit to an
exception for late payment for equitable reasons." Lauzon, 782
6

Our definition of “payment” is also informed by the New York
decisions construing that term because the compensation award was
mailed to Barry at his New York address. See South American
Petrol. Corp. v. Columbian Petrol. Co., 31 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-74
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). Under New York law, a check is not
considered absolute payment until it is honored by the drawee
bank. Demerritt v. Levitt, 419 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (N.Y. App.
Div.) appeal denied 423 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979).
Once a check has been paid by the drawee bank, the date of
payment for purposes of timeliness relates back to the date the
check was received by the payee, not the date of mailing. Duke
v. Sun Oil Co., 320 F.2d 853, 861 (5th Cir. 1963).

F.2d at 12227 .

The court held that the twenty-percent penalty

of § 914(f) is "self-executing" and automatically becomes due
upon the expiration of the ten-day period.

In essence, it is a

non-discretionary penalty that applies in every instance in which
payment is overdue.

See id.

See also Providence Washington Ins.

Co. v. Director, OWCP, 765 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985).
It is by now axiomatic that "the judiciary may not sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative

policy

determinations

made

in

areas

that

neither

affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines."
of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).

City

Absent

ambiguity in the statute, we cannot allow policy to guide our
analysis.

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (the first step in
judicial statutory construction is always to look at the text of
the

statute

and

to

stop

there

if

the

text

"unambiguously expressed intent of Congress").

reveals

the

We are not at

liberty to ignore the unambiguous mandate of this statute, nor
are we free to re-evaluate the relative burdens and benefits of a
balance that Congress has struck.

See Long Island Oil Products

Co. v. Local 553 Pension Fund, 775 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1985).
7

In Lauzon, the employer prepared the claimant’s check on
time and held the check at the employer’s office as an
accommodation to the claimant. When claimant failed to pick up
the check the employer called the claimant and left a message
with claimant’s wife. However, she forgot to tell claimant that
the check was ready. When the employer called back, yet again,
and offered to hand deliver the check the ten day period had
expired, and the claimant instructed his wife not to accept the
payment.

Sea-Land

has

inequities

justifiable

and

problems

complaints
built

into

and

fairly

this

expresses

statute,

but

the

those

complaints must be addressed to Congress and not the courts.
More than ten days lapsed between the date payment
became due on January 15, 1991 and the date payment was received
by Barry.

Thus, the Board's decision affirming the imposition of

the penalty was proper.
V.
Finally,

Sea-Land

contests

award Barry post-judgment interest.

the

Board's

decision

to

Sea-Land argues that there

is no express statutory authority for an award of interest on
overdue compensation.

The Director counters that the Act should

be construed to allow interest awards on overdue compensation and
urges us to affirm the Board's decision which relied upon the
ruling

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Ninth

Circuit

in

Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 950 F.2d 621
(9th Cir. 1991).

There, the court held that where substantial

evidence exists to support a finding that a claimant was injured
and was entitled to disability compensation under the LHWCA, and
the employer did not timely pay the disability compensation,
interest accrued on the overdue compensation.

Id. at 625.

We

are in agreement with the following reasoning of the court in
Foundation Constructors:
It is a truism that a dollar tomorrow is not
worth as much as a dollar today. Allowing an
employer
to
delay
compensation
payments
interest-free would reduce the worth of such
payments to the claimant, undermining the
remedial intent of the Act. We believe that
the Director's construction that interest may

be required on past-due compensation is
reasonable and consistent with the ends of
the Act.
Id.

See also Quave v. Progress Marine, 912 F.2d 798, 801 (5th

Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

U.S.

, 111 S. Ct. 2012 (1991);

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. Director, OWCP, 594 F.2d
986, 987 (4th Cir. 1979).

Accordingly, we uphold the Board's

award of interest to Barry.

VI.
For the reasons stated above, we will deny the petition
for review of the Board's decision. In doing so, however, we can
only hope that Congress will address the problems built into this
statute.

AFFIRMED.

